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Available online 6 April 2016Background:Micro-organisms transmitted fromvertebrate animals – including livestock – to humans account for
an estimated 60% of human pathogens. Micro-organisms can be transmitted through inhalation, ingestion, via
conjunctiva or physical contact. Close contact with animals is crucial for transmission. The role of intensity and
type of contact patterns between livestock and humans for disease transmission is poorly understood. In this
systematic review we aimed to summarise current knowledge regarding patterns of human–livestock contacts
and their role in micro-organism transmission.
Methods:We included peer-reviewed publications published between 1996 and 2014 in our systematic review if
they reported on human–livestock contacts, human cases of livestock-related zoonotic diseases or serological
epidemiology of zoonotic diseases in human samples. We extracted any information pertaining the type and
intensity of human–livestock contacts and associated zoonoses.
Results: 1522 papers were identiﬁed, 75 were included: 7 reported on incidental zoonoses after brief animal–
human contacts (e.g. farm visits), 10 on environmental exposures and 15 on zoonoses in developing countries
where backyard livestock keeping is still customary. 43 studies reported zoonotic risks in different occupations.
Occupations at risk included veterinarians, culling personnel, slaughterhouse workers and farmers. For culling
personnel, more hours exposed to livestock resulted in more frequent occurrence of transmission. Slaughter-
house workers in contact with live animals were more often positive for zoonotic micro-organisms compared
to co-workers only exposed to carcasses. Overall, little information was available about the actual mode of
micro-organism transmission.
Conclusions: Little is known about the intensity and type of contact patterns between livestock and humans that
result in micro-organism transmission. Studies performed in occupational settings provide some, but limited
evidence of exposure response-like relationships for livestock–human contact andmicro-organism transmission.
Better understanding of contact patterns driving micro-organism transmission from animals to humans is
needed to provide options for prevention and thus deserves more attention.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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41. Introduction
Zoonotic infectious diseases – diseases transmitted from vertebrate
animals to humans – account for an estimated 60% of all human
infectious diseases [1]. The rise of zoonotic diseases in humans began
after the introduction of agriculture and the domestication of animals
when humans started living in large numbers together, in close contact
with other vertebrate animals [2,3]. Nowadays, livestock associated
infectious diseases are still a major threat to human health, as recently
illustrated by the outbreak of pig origin H1N1 inﬂuenza A pandemic in
2009 or the emergence of camel-origin Middle-East Respiratory
Syndrome Coronavirus [4–6]. The occurrence of a zoonotic disease
may lead to large economic losses in the agricultural sector [7–14].
When it comes to recent emerging infectious diseases, zoonoses again
account for the majority of the newly introduced infectious diseases to
the human population. Although zoonoses with a wildlife origin domi-
nate among emerging pathogens, livestock associated zoonotic diseases
occur mainly in densely human populated areas in the world [15] and
can therefore have a considerable public health impact. In developing
countries humans often live close to their livestock [16–18]; in
developed countries there are mainly occupational contacts with large
numbers of live [19], ill [20] or dead animals [21–24], but there
are also reports of micro-organism transmissions via the environment
[25,26] or after brief contact [27,28].
Contact with livestock animals can lead to transmission of micro-
organisms by inhalation, ingestion, via conjunctiva, or during incidents
such as biting or other injuries inﬂicted by animals [29]. Furthermore,
aerosols contaminated with micro-organisms from respiratory
[30–34] or ﬂuid sources [35], can play an important role in the transmis-
sion of micro-organisms between humans [30–35], but also from
animals to humans. Aerosols have been suggested to play a role in
micro-organism transmission over very short distances, sometimes as
a parallel route to direct contact [30]. It is thus clear that for transmis-
sion of zoonotic diseases to occur, the presence of animals or some
type of contact with (livestock-) animals is crucial. Initiatives to control
livestock-associated zoonotic diseases are already in place, as reviewed
by Zinnstag et al. [36] and others [37,38]. However, better understand-
ing of contact patterns driving micro-organism transmission from ani-
mals to humans is needed to provide options for prevention and thus
deserves more attention. Therefore, in this study we reviewed current
literature on livestock-associated zoonotic diseases, to evaluate current
knowledge regarding human–livestock contact patterns. We conducted
a systematic review to identify papers reporting on livestock-related
zoonoses. We searched the publications regarding reports of contact
patterns between livestock animals and humans that led to a transmis-
sion of infectious diseases or micro-organisms from livestock to man.
2. Methods
Wesearched EMBASE andMedline for reports on livestock associated
(LA) zoonoses combined with human–livestock interactions. Our search
terms and selection steps are given in Appendix A. We also scrutinisedreferences of the included publications. Publications until the 22nd of
September 2014 were included.
We included publications reporting on zoonoses from livestock ani-
mals, human–livestock contacts, human–livestock contacts and infec-
tious disease transmission, and in case of multiple human LA-zoonosis
case reports, exact DNAmatches between livestock and human isolates.
Peer-reviewed, original research in English, Dutch or German language
was included.
We excluded articles describing; vector borne diseases, experimen-
tal laboratory studies, xenotransplantation-related diseases, reports on
diseases with livestock as a dead-end host (e.g. Rabies, Schistosomiasis,
Malaria, and Trypanosoma), papers evaluating diseases linked to wild-
life hosts (e.g. bat-related and primate (bushmeat)-related diseases),
as well as papers discussing food related zoonosis outbreaks. These
articles were excluded because these zoonotic pathogens, are not trans-
mitted through direct contact between livestock and humans.
Selected papers were either articles or articles in press, other publi-
cation types were removed from the selection. Titles and abstracts of
retrieved publications were evaluated regarding the inclusion and
exclusion criteria by GK together with RAC.3. Results
We included seventy-ﬁve articles (Fig. 1) and an overview is given in
Table 1. Eighteen infectious agents were studied in the selected papers:
Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) was studied most
often (N = 20 papers), followed by Avian Inﬂuenza (AI, N = 19) and
Coxiella burnetii (C. burnetii, N = 10). An overview of micro-organisms
and their associated host animals is provided in Table 2. The results are
divided in two sections; occupational contact and non-occupational
contact. This divisionwas based on the level of reported or assumed con-
tact between humans and livestock, with the assumption that people in
livestock handling occupations have greater exposure. Publications
reporting on zoonoses from developing countries are classiﬁed within
the non-occupational contact section, because occupations in these
countries are difﬁcult to specify and livestockexposure is not comparable
to occupational livestock exposure in developed countries.3.1. Occupational contact
The 42 selected papers in this section all originate from developed
countries. Human–livestock contacts mainly occurred in occupational
settings and concerned primarily veterinarians and veterinarymedicine
students, people culling animals for zoonotic outbreak control, hereafter
named ‘cullers’, slaughterhouse workers and farmers and their family
members. Publications discussed occurrence of:MRSA (N=18 papers),
Avian Inﬂuenza (N= 10), C. burnetti (N= 5), Swine Inﬂuenza (N= 3),
Hepatitis E virus (N = 2), Antibiotic Resistant E. coli, Avian
Metapneumovirus, Brucella spp., Chlamydophila psittaci (C. psittaci),
and Leptospira spp. (all N = 1).
Fig. 1. Flowchart of the selection steps, after the Embase and Medline search and ﬁltering procedures.
67G. Klous et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 65–763.1.1. Veterinarians and veterinary medicine students
With respect to contactwith infected animals, veterinarians and vet-
erinarymedicine students have an increased risk of acquiring infections.
Veterinarians are the ﬁrst people who come in contact with infected
animals in case of an outbreak [39]. They are at increased risk to acquire
a wide range of zoonotic infections, as was illustrated in a study among
veterinarians from South-Africa [20]. In Denmark, 36% of veterinarians
and 11% of other occupationally exposed people in contact with dairy
cattle were found positive for serological markers of C. burnetii; these
markers are indicative of (previous-) infection after exposure to
infected animals [40]. Seroconversion for C. burnetii was found in
18.7% of students whom provided a blood sample in the study of De
Rooij et al. A clear exposure–response relationship was found for the
prevalence of converted sera which increased with every year the
students advanced in their education within the study specialisation
‘farm animals’ [41]. In 44% of a cohort of Dutch veterinarians, LA-
MRSA carriage was found on at least one of the repetitive measuring
moments, 13% of all participants were persistent carriers of LA-MRSA.
This makes MRSA carriage among veterinarians extremely high,
because in the general Dutch population MRSA carriage is very rare
(b0.1%) [42]. In veterinary medicine students MRSA carriage was
detected after contact with MRSA carrying horses [43].
3.1.2. Cullers
After the ﬁrst cases of a zoonotic outbreak are identiﬁed [39], control
measure sometimes consists of the culling of the entire ﬂock or herd on
the affected farm. Cullers are usually equipped with personal protective
equipment and receive personal hygiene instructions, although it has
been shown that such measures can reduce exposure, but are not fully
protective [44,45]. Secondary cases among contacts of cullers can also
occur, as reported after a large outbreak of H7N7 Avian Inﬂuenza inDutch poultry farms in 2003 [46]. After this outbreak, risk factors for
the acquisition [39] and transmission [47] of an infection were ‘clinical
inspection of poultry in the area surrounding infected ﬂocks’ [39,47],
and ‘active culling during depopulation’ [39]. A more quantitative
relationship was reported by Whelan et al. during the large Q-fever
outbreak in the Netherlands between 2007 and 2009 [48]. In cullers
working on Q-fever infected goat farms, an exposure-response-like
relationship between the ‘total number of hours worked inside the
farm perimeter’ and ‘working mostly inside stables’ and the risk of
seroconversion for C. burnetiimarkers was discovered [48].
3.1.3. Slaughterhouse workers
The most relevant observations in this occupational group are the
exposure–response relationships for micro-organism carriage or
transmission found in slaughterhouse personnel, in particular those
individuals in close contact with live animals [21–24]. Four reports,
three addressing MRSA and one C. psittaci, in both pig and poultry
slaughterhouses, demonstrated clear relationships between the position
of the workers on the slaughter line and carriage of micro-organisms or
occurrence of disease [21–24]. This was supported by evidence for both
temporal and spatial variations for micro-organism levels in air, on
gloves and surface contamination. Temporal, because during the day an
increase of MRSA and C. psittaci environmental levels were shown [22,
24]. Spatial, because people at the start of the slaughter line working
with live animals, were more often found to be carriers of MRSA,
compared to people only working with carcasses [21–24].
That living animals were the main risk factor for carriage or infec-
tions with micro-organisms was also shown by Myers et al.: they
reported that farmers showed the highest Swine Inﬂuenza H1N1 speciﬁc
titres in their blood, compared to a pool of veterinarians, control subjects
and slaughterhouse workers [49].
Table 1
Overviewof the selected publications. The columns depict; ﬁrst author, year of publication, countrywhere the studywas performed, study category, occupational exposure (YES/NO, YES versusNO)withN: number of people exposed,micro-organism
studied, livestock involved if (YES): animals are screened for amicro-organism, description of the people involved,main study conclusion, reference number. There are three study categories; seroepidemiology reports on studieswhere blood samples
were analysed for speciﬁc disease markers, risk analyses reports on speciﬁc risk factors for acquiring a micro-organism and source attribution, studies where the source of speciﬁc micro-organism is identiﬁed after human cases or carriage of the
speciﬁedmicro-organism. For occupational exposure (YES or NO) the number of either occupational exposed, non-occupational exposed or occupational versus non-occupational exposed people are given. The columnwith the description of people
includes occupations and when available also descriptions of control groups.
Author Year Country Study category Occupational exposure
(N=)
Micro-organism Animals involved
(screened?)
People involved Main outcomes Reference
number
Al-Ani 2004 Jordan Risk analyses YES vs. NO (100 vs. 800) Brucella spp. Sheep, goats (YES) Vetsa, sheepherders, lab technicians More Brucella seroprevalence in
human high risk group
[85]
Bos 2010 Netherlands Source attribution YES (872) H7N7 Avian Inﬂuenza Turkeys, layers, broilers Cullers, cleaners, biosecurity
managers
High infection probability for exposure
infected poultry
[39]
Bosnjak 2010 Denmark Seroepidemiology YES (359) Coxiella burnetii Cattle Farmers, vetsa, inseminators,
Hoof-trimmers
34% in vets seroconverted for
C. burnetti, 11% others
[40]
Buxton-Bridges 2002 Hong Kong Seroepidemiology YES (1525/293) H5N1 Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry Poultry workers, government
workers (cullers)
More poultry related tasks, more
anti-H5 seropositivity
[61]
Castillo-Neyra 2014 USA, NC Risk analyses YES vs. NO (162 vs. 63,
111)
MRSA, MDRSAb Pigs Processing plant workers, family,
residents
Processing workers, more MRSA,
MDR-SA, than controls
[51]
De Marco 2013 Italy Risk analyses YES vs. NO (123 vs. 379) Swine Inﬂuenza
H1N1pandemicc,
H1N1swined
Pigs Swine workers, Non-exposed
controls
Exposure H1N1sw gives
cross-immunity for H1N1pdm
[63]
De Rooij 2012 Netherlands Seroepidemiology YES (674) Coxiella burnetii “Farm animals”k Veterinary medicine students 18,7% of vet. Students seroconverted
for C. burnetii
[41]
Di Trani 2012 Italy Risk analyses YES vs. NO (188 vs. 379) H5 and H7 Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry Poultry workers, Non-exposed
controls
Poultry workers more H7-AB positive,
than controls
[60]
Dickx 2010 Belgium Seroepidemiology YES (53, 38) Chlamydophila psittaci Chickens, turkeys Chicken and turkey slaughterhouse
workers
Live animal contact risk, for C. psittaci
seropositivity
[24]
Gaede 2008 Germany Source attribution YES (24) Chlamydophila psittaci Poultry (YES) Poultry owners Genotype C. psittaci similar in poultry
and humans
[101]
Geenen 2013 Netherlands Source attribution YES (145) MRSA Broilers (YES) Workers and residents poultry farm People on MRSA positive farms, also
MRSA carriers
[72]
Gilbert 2011 Netherlands Source attribution YES (341) MRSA Pigs (YES) Pig slaughterhouse workers Working with live animals, risk for
human MRSA carriage
[21]
Gilpin 2008 New-Zealand Source attribution YES and NO (7) Campylobacter spp. Cattle (YES) Dairy workers, resident children Cattle found Campylobacter positive,
after human cases
[102]
Gordoncillo 2011 USA, MI Source attribution NO MRSA Pigs (YES) Hobby pig owners Matched hobby pig farmers-pigs not
both MRSA carriers
[73]
Graveland 2011 Netherlands Seroepidemiology YES (155) MRSA Veal calves Veal calve farmers Human MRSA carriage, reduced when
cattle was absent
[19]
Gray 2008 USA, IA Risk analyses YES vs. NO (385 vs. 418,
66)
Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry Agricultural workers, University
controls
Avian Inﬂuenza seropositivity in
poultry workers
[58]
Gummow 2003 South-Africa Interview study YES (88) All zoonotic diseases “Farm animals”k University employed vetsa Wide range of zoonoses reported by
vets in their career
[20]
Hackert 2012 Netherlands Risk analyses YES vs. NO (26, 50, 14 vs.
253)
Coxiella burnetii Goats Farm residents/workers, visitors,
household contacts
Seroconversion C. burnetii related to
farm distance
[25]
Helmy 2013 Egypt Source attribution NO (165) Cryptosporidium parvum Cattle, buffalo (YES) Farm children LA-Cryptosporidium related to
children's diarrhoea cases
[18]
Hoek 2008 United Kingdom Source attribution NO (20) Cryptosporidium parvum Sheep (YES) Students and teachers camping on a
farm
No pathway found for farm visit
C. parvum infections
[93]
Huijbers 2013 Netherlands Risk analyses NO (1025) ESBLl-Enterobacteriaceae Poultry Residents in a high and low poultry
density area
5.1% ESBL-positive, lower risk ESBL
carriage near poultry
[98]
Huijsdens 2006 Netherlands Risk analyses YES vs. NO (3 vs. 3) MRSA Pigs Farmworkers and family members Molecular analyses link human MRSA
to pigs
[64]
Huo 2012 China (Jiangsu) Seroepidemiology YES (306) H5N1 Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry Poultry workers Poultry workers seropositive for Avian
Inﬂuenza
[86]
Kandeel 2010 Egypt Seroepidemiology NO (6355) H5N1 Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry All people having AI symptoms Avian Inﬂuenza risk factors: rearing,
slaughtering poultry
[80]
Kayali 2011 USA Risk analyses YES vs. NO (57, 38 vs. 82) Avian Metapneumovirus Turkeys Turkey growers and processing
workers, controls
Turkey slaughters Avian Metapneumo
virus positive
[53]
Koopmans 2004 Netherlands Seroepidemiology YES (453) H7N7 Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry Poultry farmers, farmworkers,
family
Cullers and contacts seropositive for
H7-antibodies
[46]
Köck 2012 Germany Source attribution YES (35) MRSA ST398 Pigs Pig farmers 59% farmers still MRSA carriers after
holidays
[71]
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Krumbholtz 2012 Germany Risk analyses YES vs. NO (24, 14, 46, 22
vs. 116)
Hepatitis E virus Pigs Slaughterers, meat inspectors,
farmers, vetsa, controls
Slaughterhouse workers more positive
HEV antibodies
[52]
Leibler 2010 USA (MD, VA) Risk analyses YES vs. NO (24 vs. 75) Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry Poultry workers, agricultural
community members
No seropositivity Avian Inﬂuenza in US
poultry workers
[57]
Liu 2008 China (Pearl river
delta)
Descriptive study n.a. Avian Inﬂuenza, not focuse Chickens, turkeys Chicken owners No epidemiology, overview poultry
practises China
[16]
Lohiniva 2012 Egypt Risk analyses n.a. H5N1 Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry Households with chickens Overview post outbreak measures on
poultry practises
[17]
López-Robles 2012 Mexico Risk analyses YES vs. NO (62 vs. 63) Swine Inﬂuenza Pigs Swine workers, non-exposed
controls
Swine workers compared with general
public
[62]
Lyytikäinen 1998 Germany Seroepidemiology NO (239) Coxiella burnetii Sheep All residents in a speciﬁc rural area Speciﬁc sheep ﬂock linked to human
Q-fever cases
[99]
Manfredi-Selvaggi 1996 Italy Seroepidemiology NO (58) Coxiella burnetii Sheep All residents in a speciﬁc rural area Passing sheep ﬂock causes human
Q-fever outbreak
[100]
Meader 2009 United Kingdom Seroepidemiology YES (413) Hepatitis E virus Cat, chicken, deer, goat,
horse, pig, sheep
UK Farmers Cohort Animal contact risk factor HEV, pigs
not speciﬁc
[56]
Milne 1999 United Kingdom Source attribution NO (3) VTEC 0157f Escherichia coli Goats, cattle (YES) Children visiting recreational
educational farm
Outbreak E. coli O157 linked to public
accessible farm
[91]
Ming 2006 China Source attribution YES (100 exposed, 30
infected)
Trichophyton verrucosum Cattle (YES) Animal workers Cattle and farm workers infected with
T. verrucosum
[87]
Monno 2009 South-Italy Risk analyses YES vs. NO (128 vs. 280) Coxiella burnetii, Leptospira
spp., Brucella spp.
“Farm animals”k Animal workers, vets*, blood donors C. burnetii seroconversion found in
Animal workers
[55]
Morgan 2009 United Kingdom Seroepidemiology YES (142) H7N3 Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry People in contact with live or death
infected animals
Incomplete PPE, resulted in signiﬁcant
infection risk
[45]
Mulders 2010 Netherlands Source attribution YES (466) MRSA Poultry (YES) Poultry slaughterhouse personal Working with live animals, risk for
human MRSA carriage
[23]
Myers 2006 USA Risk analyses YES vs. NO (111, 97, 65 vs.
79)
Swine Inﬂuenza Pigs Farmers, meat processing workers,
vetsa, controls
More SI seroprevalence in
work-exposed, than controls
[49]
Okoye 2013 Nigeria Risk analyses YES vs. NO (316 vs. 54) Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry Farmers, open market workers,
controls
No risk factor identiﬁed for Avian
Inﬂuenza transmission
[83]
Oppliger 2012 West-Switzerland Source attribution YES (67, 8) MRSA Pigs (YES) Pig farmers, vetsa Pig and farmer/vet MRSA similar
serotypes
[67]
Ortiz 2006 Nigeria (Kano) Seroepidemiology YES (295, 25) H5N1 Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry Poultry workers, laboratory workers No serological evidence for H5N1
infections identiﬁed
[82]
Osadebe 2012 USA (CT) Source attribution YES MRSA Pigs (YES) Pig farmers Pigs carried human MRSA serotypes,
possible anthroponosis
[74]
Padungtod 2005 North-Thailand Source attribution YES and NO (197, 4 and
100, 205)
Campylobacter Chickens, pigs, dairy cattle
(YES)
Farm staff, slaughterers,
community, diarrhoea patients
Campylobacter found in food animals
and environments
[111]
Petersen 2012 Denmark Seroepidemiology NO MRSA mecC gene positiveg Cattle, sheep All MRSA samples from national
databank
Cattle/sheep contact, possible risk
factor mecC MRSA
[97]
Pletinckx 2012 Belgium Source attribution YES and NO (10, 10 and
13)
MRSA ST398h Pigs, poultry, cattle, dogs,
cats, rodents (YES)
Farmers, vetsa, family members of
farmers
Farms LA-MRSA positive,
environment, humans, animals
[65]
Puzelli 2005 Italy Seroepidemiology YES (983) Avian Inﬂuenza; H7N1 HPAIi,
H7N3 LPAIj
Poultry Poultry workers Poultry workers H7N3
seropositive,after avian outbreak
[59]
Rabinowitz 2012 Egypt Source attribution n.a. H5N1 Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry, wild birds All H5N1 conﬁrmed human cases Comparison animal and human H5N1
data bases
[84]
Radon 2007 Germany Source attribution NO (2425) n.a. “Farm animals”k Neighbours conﬁned animal feeding
operations (CAFO)
Adverse-health effects residents with
CAFO b 500 m home
[94]
Schimmer 2012 Netherlands Seroepidemiology YES (268) Coxiella burnetii Goats People living or working on dairy
goat farms
C. burnetii seroconversion in farmers,
spouses, children
[54]
Schulze 2011 Germany Source attribution NO (457) n.a. “Farm animals”k Non-farm residents NH3 as proxy for exposure from CAFOs
to residents
[95]
Scott 2005 USA Source attribution YES and NO (472) Antibiotic Resistant
Escherichia coli
Pigs (YES) Consumers, pig workers,
slaughter-plant workers
No similarity E. coli resistance proﬁles,
pigs and humans
[50]
Siwila 2007 Zambia Source attribution YES (82, 207) Cryptosporidium parvum Cattle (YES) Farm workers, household members Similar Cryptosporidium found in
humans and calves
[81]
Skowronski 2007 Canada Seroepidemiology YES (167) H7N3 Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry Cullers, farmers, family members PPE should be combined with
vaccination, prophylaxis
[44]
Smit 2012 Netherlands Risk analyses NO (95,548) Coxiella burnetii Goats, poultry Residents, general practitioners data Poultry risk for pneumonia, goats risk
for Q-fever
[26]
Spohr 2011 SW-Germany Source attribution YES (9) MRSA Cattle, pigs (YES) People working on cattle farms MRSA found in every section of the
farm and on farmers
[69]
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued)
Author Year Country Study category Occupational exposure
(N=)
Micro-organism Animals involved
(screened?)
People involved Main outcomes Reference
number
Te Beest 2011 Netherlands Source attribution YES H7N7 Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry (YES) People that visited farms during on
H7N7 AI outbreak
Humans act as vector for H7N7
between poultry farms
[47]
Thorson 2006 Vietnam Source attribution NO (45,478) Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry All residents in a speciﬁc rural area Flu-like symptoms linked to handling
live, death poultry
[77]
Tissot-Dupont 2005 France Source attribution NO (85) Coxiella burnetii Sheep All people positive for IgG or IgM
against C. burnetii
Speciﬁc pedagogical farm source
Q-fever outbreak
[28]
Trevena 1999 United Kingdom Source attribution YES and NO (69) VTEC 0157f Escherichia coli Cattle, pony, dog (YES) People working, living or visiting a
farm
VTEC O157 infections after animal
contact, food products
[92]
Uzel 2005 Turkey Risk analyses NO (9) Orf virus Sheep, goat People illegally slaughtering
animals
Sheep/goat related Orf cases, after
feast-of-sacriﬁce
[90]
Van Cleef 2010 Netherlands Risk analyses YES vs. NO (49 vs. 534) MRSA ST398h Pigs People living or working on farms,
non-farm residents
MRSA ST398 in farm population
(26.5%), controls (0.2%)
[96]
Van Cleef 2011 Netherlands Risk analyses YES (40) MRSA Veal calves Fieldworkers Short MRSA exposure leads to
carriage, cleared after 24 h
[66]
Van Cleef 2010 Netherlands Risk analyses YES (249) MRSA Pigs Pig slaughterhouse workers Working with live animals, risk for
human MRSA carriage
[22]
Van den Broek 2009 Netherlands Source attribution YES (50, 171, 11) MRSA Pigs (YES) Farmers, family, farm workers Only human MRSA carriage on farms
with positive pigs
[70]
Van der Hoek 2011 Netherlands Risk analyses n.a. Coxiella burnetii Goats, sheep, cattle All residents in a speciﬁc rural area Protective factors human Q-fever;
vegetation, moist soil
[120]
Van Duijkeren 2010 Netherlands Source attribution YES vs. NO (61, 106 vs. 64) MRSA ST398h Horses (YES) Veterinary teaching hospital staff
and students
Vet. students, staff and horses carried
same MRSA ST398
[43]
Van Kerkhove 2008 Cambodia Risk analyses NO (3600) H5N1 Avian Inﬂuenza Poultry Households with chickens Model H5N1 risks, poultry contact as
transmission proxy
[78]
Verkade 2013 Netherlands Risk analyses YES (137) MRSA ST398h Pigs, veal calves Livestock vetsa Veterinarians often (persistent-)
carriers MRSA ST398
[42]
Wang 2014 Australia,
Cambodia
Source attribution YES vs. NO (36 vs. 210) Blastocystis Pigs (YES) Pig farm workers (Australia), Village
people (Cambodia)
Blastocystis zoonotic Australia, non-
zoonotic Cambodia
[76]
Whelan 2011 Netherlands Seroepidemiology YES (517 ≥ 246) Coxiella burnetii Goat, sheep Culling workers Exposure-response like
seroconversion for C. burnetii
[48]
Wong 2012 USA (PA) Seroepidemiology NO (127) H3N2 Swine Inﬂuenza Pigs Members of an agricultural club Closeness contact pigs determines
H3N2 seropositivity
[27]
Wulf 2011 Netherlands Risk analyses YES and NO (640) MRSA ST398h Pigs, veal calves Study on screening data for MRSA Work related LA-MRSA infections
increased over years
[68]
n.a.: Not applicable
a Veterinarians.
b Multidrug-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
c H1N1 2009 pandemic Inﬂuenza strain.
d H1N1 swine Inﬂuenza strain.
e The focus in this study was on poultry keeping practises, Avian Inﬂuenza was only brieﬂy mentioned and therefore not the focus of the study.
f Verotoxin-producing Escherichia coli, strain O157.
g Speciﬁc livestock related S. aureus resistance gene.
h Sequence Type 398, livestock derived S. aureus substrain.
i High pathogenic Avian Inﬂuenza.
j Low pathogenic Avian Inﬂuenza.
k Livestock types not speciﬁed, all farm animals included to the study.
l Extended-Spectrum-β-lactamase producing.
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71G. Klous et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 65–76Scott et al. found no relationship between antibiotic resistance
patterns of E. coli isolated from pigs and isolates from slaughterhouse
workers [50]. However, S. aureus isolates carried by slaughterhouse
workers were found to be more extensively resistant to antibiotics
compared to community controls [51]. An increased risk for Hepatitis
E virus infection in people occupationally exposed to pigs was found,
especially for slaughterhouse workers [52]. Also, meat-processing
workers had been more often infected with avian Metapneumovirus
compared to controls [53].3.1.4. Farmers
Farmers face daily exposure to LA-micro-organisms in every aspect
of their work. Still, it is very hard to determine which activity leads to
transmission of micro-organisms. In this group, outbreaks are often
investigated in a retrospective way, i.e. by performing serological
epidemiology, analysing blood samples for antibodies against speciﬁc
pathogens. This procedure does not allow distinguishing between past
and more recent transmission events.
In theNetherlands, antibodies against C. burnetiiwere found in 73.5%
of blood samples from farmers keeping dairy goats [54]. In an Italian
study, animal workers were checked for blood markers against
C. burnetii, Leptospira spp. and Brucella spp. Only for C. burnetii a higher
sero-prevalence of 73.4% was found in animal workers, compared with
13.6% in controls [55]. For the evaluation of Hepatitis E virus, these links
were not as clear as for Q-fever: serological epidemiology in a farmer
cohort in the United Kingdom showed high Hepatitis E virus sero-
positivity, but pig contact was not found to represent a risk factor [56].
In another study from Germany, however, increased Hepatitis E virus
positivity in people with contact with pigs was shown, compared to
age- and gender-matched controls [52].
The literature is also inconsistent for Avian Inﬂuenza. One study
from the US indicated no human antibody sero-positivity of Avian
Inﬂuenza subtypes prevalent in poultry among poultry workers [57],
while other studies from the US and Italy did show similar Avian
Inﬂuenza subtypes in poultry and poultry workers [58–60]. Evidence
fromHong Kong even indicated an exposure–response-like relationship
for H5N1 Avian Inﬂuenza transmission: more anti-H5 antibodies
were found in poultry workers with more poultry-related tasks
compared to community controls. Direct contact to poultry and
butchering poultry was identiﬁed as risk factors carrying the highest
infection risk [61]. For Swine Inﬂuenza studies are consistent, three
studies reported serological antibody presence against swine inﬂu-
enza in pig farmers and workers [49,62,63]. Remarkably, the study
of De Marco et al. reported cross-protective immunity against the
2009 human pandemic Inﬂuenza A in swine workers exposed to
pigs and Swine Inﬂuenza [63].
Other research in farmers mainly focussed on antimicrobial-
resistant zoonotic organism carriage. These studies often have a
different design, utilising cross-sectional or cohort designs, occasionally
with repeated measurements. LA-MRSA [64] can be transmitted
between animal species [65] and from animals to humans [65–68],
but also from animals to the farm environment, although the host
preferences differ [65,69]. One study identiﬁed a correlation between
the carriage prevalence in pigs and the likelihood of human LA-MRSA
carriage [70]. Still, the prevalence of persistent LA-MRSA carriage
among farmers is relatively low [71] and most individuals show
relatively rapid clearing of LA-MRSA carriage [19,66]. In poultry farms,
MRSA positivity was found to be less prevalent compared to veal calf
and pig farms. This could explain the limited carriage in poultryworkers
[72] and among people who keep poultry at home [73]. In addition, the
reverse transmission route has also been proposed, with the evidence
for a reverse zoonosis/anthroponosis being pigs positive for healthcare
associated-MRSA, thus indicating farmer-to-pig MRSA spread [74].
This theory is enhanced by evidence showing that LA-MRSA is less
transmissible between people, compared to other MRSA types [75].
72 G. Klous et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 65–763.2. Non-occupational contact
Contact to livestock could also occur in non-occupational settings
and may lead to transmission or infection with zoonotic micro-
organisms. Both direct contact and dispersion through air can account
for micro-organism transmission events. In this section 30 publications
are discussed, focussing on: Avian Inﬂuenza (N= 9 papers), C. burnetii
(N = 5), Cryptosporidium parvum (C. parvum, N = 3), MRSA (N = 2),
Verotoxin producing E. coli (VTEC) O157 (N= 2), Blastocytosis, Brucella
spp., Trichophyton verrucosum (T. verricosum), Campylobacter spp., Orf
virus, Salmonella spp. and Swine Inﬂuenza (all N = 1).
3.2.1. Developing countries
Especially in developing countries, transmission of micro-organisms
can occur from live animals or via blood products from slaughtering
practiseswithin the home setting, but the actual transmission pathways
are often unknown. In these countries livestock keeping is common
practise for many families and animals are frequently kept in the
home backyard for egg, milk or meat production [16,17,76–80,18,
81–85]. Backyard poultry keeping has been linked to Avian Inﬂuenza
transmission on many occasions. This was found by Thornson et al.
performing interviews in Vietnam, asking for poultry contact and ﬂulike
illness [77], modelled by Van Kerkhove et al. in Cambodia after
interviewing people regarding their poultry contacts [78], and shown
among Egyptian women by Kandeel and colleagues performing a risk
factor analysis of all suspected Avian Inﬂuenza cases in Egypt [80].
China knows a broad diversity in livestock farming practises, ranging
frompoultry farmingwith people involved in all stages of theproduction
cycle [86], to large industriallymanaged cattle herds [87]. In both of these
situations zoonotic disease transmissions have been described from live-
stock to humans, Avian Inﬂuenza and T. verricosum, respectively [86,87].
In summary, literature to date is not informative regarding which
livestock–human contact pattern leads to zoonotic disease transmission
in developing countries.
3.2.2. Brief contact
In some instances, very brief exposure may be sufﬁcient for trans-
mission of micro-organisms, especially when the infectious dose of a
pathogen is very low [88]. This was shown in Germany in a study focus-
sing on LA-MRSA carriage among farmers and residents in an area with
a high density of livestock farms. Farmersweremainly at riskwhen they
had pig contact, but the authors also found that regular visits to farms –
e.g. to buy eggs or milk – increased the chance of becoming a LA-MRSA
carrier among non-farm residents [89]. In Turkey, preparing freshly
slaughtered sheep led to transmission of Orf virus during the feast of
sacriﬁce, an Islamic tradition, among non-occupationally exposed peo-
ple [90]. Visits to an agricultural fair in the US resulted in transmission
of Swine Inﬂuenza between displayed pigs and human visitors [27].
Visitors of a pedagogical farm in France were reported to be infected
with Q-fever [28] and gastrointestinal infections with VTEC O157
occurred on a farm open to the public in the UK [91]. VTEC O157
infections were also observed among ‘holidaymakers’, ‘farm visitors’,
‘farming families’ and ‘farm workers’ [92]. Still, the actual pathway of
an infection was not speciﬁcally ascertained in most papers. This was
illustrated by an outbreak of C. parvum among children camping on an
adventure farm in the UK [93].
3.2.3. Environmental transmission
This section summarises reports where people indicated that they
had no direct contact to livestock animals, but experienced adverse-
health effects due to livestock in their immediate surroundings.
These articles indicated that close contact to livestock animals was not
necessary for a transmission event to occur, but that already living in
close vicinity of livestock could be enough for the occurrence of adverse
health effects among residents.Respiratory health can be affected by many sources, including
livestock farming in the vicinity of a residence. In Germany, reduced
respiratory health of residents was linked to the presence of Conﬁned
Animal Feeding Operations, industrially managed livestock stables,
near their home address. Although these studies did not focus on
infectious diseases, they did indicate effects of livestock keeping on
the health of nearby residents [94,95]. In a Dutch study investigating
LA-MRSA presence in a rural population, only direct animal contact
was found as a risk factor [96]. When the Danish national human
MRSA database was checked for a livestock-associated MecC resistance
gene, this wasmainly found in samples from people living in rural parts
of the country and animal contact was an important risk factor. Still, the
genewas also discovered in humanMRSA samples frompeople living in
rural areas, but having no livestock contact [97]. An attempt to identify
risk factors for Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase (ESBL) Enterobacte-
riaceae carriage among people living in high- and low-poultry density
areas in the Netherlands showed no elevated risk between the distance
of positive poultry farms from the home and ESBL carriage of residents
[98]. For Q-fever, however, the link between living close to infected
farms and human cases of the disease is well established [25,26,88]. In
the Netherlands, a large outbreak occurred in recent years and an expo-
sure–response-like relationship was found for the number of goats
within 5 km of the home address and human cases [26]. In Germany,
a speciﬁc ﬂock of sheep could even be identiﬁed as the source of a
human Q-fever outbreak in a village [99]. In Italy, where in some areas
free-range sheep herding is still common practise, the passing of three
ﬂocks of infected sheep through a village led to an outbreak of Q-fever
[100].
4. Discussion
This review is a ﬁrst attempt to summarise what is currently known
regarding the nature of livestock–human interactions in the transmis-
sion of infectious diseases between livestock and humans. We per-
formed a systematic procedure to identify current literature applying
predeﬁned criteria regarding livestock-associated zoonoses and tried
to distinguish contact patterns between livestock and humans leading
up to this zoonosis event. Zoonotic events can be reported in three
ways. First, an outbreak is noticed in animals, followed by cases in
humans [101]. Second, a cluster of human zoonosis cases appears,
after which possible animal sources are identiﬁed [64,102]. The third
way is retrospective, comparing blood samples from animal-exposed
and non-exposed people for infectious disease markers [54], these are
mainly cross-sectional studies, which may be subject to selection bias.
We identiﬁed 75 articles discussingmicro-organism transmission or
infections due to livestock associatedmicro-organisms. For people with
occupational contact with livestock, the risk of acquiring micro-
organisms from livestock was especially elevated, since transmission
of infections seems to be possible during all phases of the livestock pro-
duction cycle; from stables until the slaughterhouse [103]. Among the
papers discussing occupational exposure to livestock, we found only
two studies that assessed livestock contact quantitatively. These papers
crudely estimated the number of hours spent among infected animals
[48], or the number of tasks for handling infected animals [61]. A
more detailed exposure assessment tackling concentration, exposure
duration and frequency [104], however, is lacking.
Four studies were identiﬁed that showed spatial exposure relation-
ships within slaughterhouses [19–22], and two of these also showed a
temporal variability in environmental levels of micro-organisms
[21–24]. Although these papers gave an indication of how transmission
of micro-organisms from livestock to humans occurred, transmission
routeswere not speciﬁcallymentioned in the studies. Themeasured ex-
posure proxies and related health effects can therefore not be speciﬁed
for the potential transmission pathways.
For non-infectious disease studies, a detailed framework has been
deﬁned for possible exposure routes [105]. Such a framework is also
73G. Klous et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 65–76of potential importance for infectious disease studies because it
describes all potential direct and indirect transmission routes. Therefore
for LA-substances such as; particulate matter, gases, environmental
micro-organisms and non-infectious (micro-)organism lysis products
called endotoxins [106–110], time-weighted averages [106–108],
or even task speciﬁc levels of endotoxins [110] are available. This
enables exposure assessment for these substances within the farm
environment.
Unfortunately, comparable sampling methods were not applied in
the aforementioned studies on C. burnetii and Avian Inﬂuenza [48,61].
This could be due to lack of experience with thesemethods or technical
difﬁculties due to micro-organism features, such as difﬁculty to catch
and culture pathogenic strains. With the rise of molecular techniques,
in future outbreaks concentrations of pathogens could be quantiﬁed,
when combined with information on the duration and frequency of
exposure, exposures can be assessed and exposure-response models
can be developed for these pathogens.
For people not working in an occupation with livestock, the
exposure to zoonotic micro-organisms is much lower compared to
people with an occupation in the livestock sector. In developing
countries it is often impossible to distinguish transmission pathways
ofmicro-organisms since people are exposed to animals in both occupa-
tional settings and at home [16,17,76–80,18,81–84,111].
We found several papers reporting brief exposure to livestock
animals that resulted in zoonotic disease transmission to people who
were not occupationally exposed to livestock. Remarkably, brief contact
in these studies was sufﬁcient to transfer micro-organisms to suscepti-
ble persons, still the nature of these contacts remain elusive [27,28,66,
90–93]. Perhaps the contact moment was not even necessary for
disease transmission, but the environmental presence of high levels of
micro-organisms surrounding infected animals, shown in other studies
[112–119], was sufﬁcient for a transmission event.
Environmental presence of LA-micro-organisms and other LA-
emissions is the explanatory factor for the occurrence of LA-adverse
health effects in people that did not have any contact with livestock,
but were nevertheless affected by livestock in the vicinity of their
home [25,26,94–97,99,100,120]. For both transmissions due to brief
contact and environmental transmission of micro-organisms, micro-
organism transmission pathways are hard to distinguish. Generally,
people with adverse health effects from livestock in the vicinity of
their homes are residents of rural areas, therefore (brief) livestock–
human contact cannot be completely excluded in these studies.
Since there are so many unknown factors in the knowledge about
livestock contact and zoonotic micro-organism transmission, it is very
hard to optimise interventions, minimising effects of a future outbreak
on public health. However, some suggestions on intervention can be
given. For the occupational setting: In case of an animal outbreak,
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) use by cullers should be
reinforced, especially in case of infectious micro-organisms that can be
inhaled [30]. For slaughterhouse workers, PPE appears to be especially
relevant for people working on the start of the slaughter line, since
they seem to be exposed to the highest levels of zoonotic micro-organ-
isms [21–24]. Since the protective abilities of PPE have been shown to
not always be optimal [30,44–46], vaccination, if available, of cullers
and slaughterhouse workers [44,121] may be considered, as well as
usage of prophylactic drugs for cullers during their work [44]. For
farmers, PPE can be used when they enter the stables, combined with
a standardised general on-farm hygiene protocol [122]. When it
comes to protecting the general public, in case of zoonotic outbreaks,
there is always a risk of spread of micro-organisms from an infected
farm to the direct environment [112–119], and farm-emissions are
difﬁcult to control [26,94,95,110]. The possible solution to control
(infectious-)farm-emissions is complete closure of stables, combined
with effective airﬁltering orwashing systems [123], alsomanure should
be handled with outmost care, since this can contain several micro-
organisms [41,43,80–83].Additional to the suggested measures regular and close surveillance
of farms and both human and livestock health databases for LA-micro-
organisms could be implemented to identify a zoonotic disease
outbreak as early as possible.
The limitation of our study was that in most reports on zoonotic
disease occurrence in humans, the intensity and the type of contacts
between livestock and humans leading to the actual disease or micro-
organism transmission were only implicitly cited. Therefore, it is
virtually impossible to identify speciﬁc livestock–human interactions
that lead to infectious disease transmission. This makes it very difﬁcult
to avert these interactions and even more challenging to design tailor-
ﬁt transmission preventive interventions.
4.1. Conclusions and future perspectives
Although, we found a signiﬁcant body of evidence that described
zoonotic transmissions of micro-organisms, little is known about the
intensity and type of contact patterns leading to transmission, and
thus the exact transmission pathways of micro-organisms from
livestock to humans usually remains unclear. Human–livestock contacts
were merely implicitly cited in the literature, and commonly, contact
intensity was deﬁned by the occupational status of the person carrying
or infected with a LA-micro-organism. Studies performed in an occupa-
tional setting provided some evidence of exposure response relation-
ships between the intensity of livestock–human contacts and the
transmission of micro-organisms. Using methods that are already in
place in the exposure assessment sciences [110], exposure to LA-
zoonotic micro-organisms through contact patterns between livestock
and humans, can be better quantiﬁed both in the occupational and the
non-occupational setting. This will be crucial in the development of
effective interventions to prevent transmission of micro-organisms
from livestock to humans.
Authors contribution
GK, AH, DJJH and RAC designed the study, GK wrote the paper, GK
and RAC reviewed the selected papers, AH, DJJH and RAC revised it
critically for important intellectual content. All authors approved the
submitted version of the article.
Conﬂicts of interest
None.
Funding source
University Medical Centre Utrecht.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Daisy de Vries and Romin Pajouheshnia for critically
reading the ﬁnal version of the manuscript.
Appendix A. Search terms and ﬁlter settings
A.1. Search terms
The following Boolean search statement was used in EMBASE, set to
‘search as broadly as possible’; [(zoonoses'/exp./mj OR ‘zoonoses' OR
‘zoonosis'/exp./mj OR ‘zoonosis' OR ‘infectious disease’ OR ‘human
infection’ OR ‘human case’) AND (‘livestock’/exp./mj OR ‘livestock’ OR
‘farm animal’/exp./mj OR ‘farm animal’ OR ‘cow’/exp./mj OR ‘cow’ OR
‘cattle’/exp./mj OR ‘cattle’ OR ‘cattle’ OR ‘chicken’/exp./mj OR ‘chicken’
OR ‘poultry’/exp./mj OR ‘poultry’ OR ‘turkey’ OR ‘duck’/exp./mj OR
‘duck’ OR ‘sheep’/exp./mj OR ‘sheep’ OR ‘goat’/exp./mj OR ‘goat’ OR ‘ru-
minants'/exp./mj OR ‘ruminants' OR ‘small ruminants' OR ‘pig’/exp./mj
74 G. Klous et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 65–76OR ‘pig’OR ‘pigs' OR ‘swine’/exp./mj OR ‘swine’) AND (‘contact’OR ‘con-
tact intensity’ OR ‘bioaerosol’OR ‘environmental’OR ‘exposure’/exp./mj
OR ‘exposure’ OR ‘occupational’ OR ‘work’ OR ‘work related’ OR
‘workers' OR ‘culling’ OR ‘residents' OR ‘residential’) AND (‘transfer’
OR ‘exchange’ OR ‘transmission’) NOT (‘toxicity’/exp./mj OR ‘toxicity’
OR ‘microextraction’ OR ‘tick’/exp./mj OR ‘tick’ OR ‘rabies'/exp./mj OR
‘rabies' OR ‘schistosoma’/exp./mj OR ‘schistosoma’ OR ‘transplant’)].
A.2. Filter settings
Date preferences were set to b1966 to 2014, so no data restrictions
were applied to the search. Filters were set for; study types (human,
nonhuman, questionnaire, case report, cross-sectional study, interview,
case control study and cohort analysis) and ﬂoating subheadings
(epidemiology, aetiology, prevention, diagnosis, complication, drug
resistance and disease management).
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